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Between 1971 and·l978 wages of more than half a million nonwhite laborers 
in the· South African mines tripled in real terms. In the same period, the 
nonwhites employed in the mines switched from being 62 percent foreign to 62 
percent domestic. 1 These changes followed a period -- from 1911 to 1971 --
during which real wages of black gold miners did not rise, and terminated 
almost a century of reliance on foreign labor "reserves" for the majority of 
such labor. 2 
These dramatic events are examined here in the context of an econometric 
model of the demand for labor by the South African mining sector from 1946 to 
1980. This affords an unusual opportunity to study the demand side of a 
market for internal and international migrants, in a society where racial 
discrimination is formalized in- the apartheid system, where •powerful minlng 
houses wield potential monopsony power, and political factors in the region 
are major determinants of economic behavior. 
To comprehend the derived demand for workers in this sector, it is 
essential to outline at least certain aspects of the industry's organization 
and that of the market for 1 abor. This is undertaken in sect i o'n I, section I I 
develops a stylized model, which is then estimated, from data described in 
II I, for the go 1 d, diamond, coa 1 and other mi nera 1 s sectors separately in 
section IV. 
I. Organization of the Mine Labor Market 
Ninety percent of the 700,000 workers employed in the South African mines 
in 1980 were nonwhite. Most are employed in mines affiliated with the Chamber 
of Mines, one of whose chief functions is to organize hiring and wage policy 
for the sector. For example, the Chamber -- an organization of employers 
without government or labor representation -- for many years imposed on 
members a "maximum permissible average" wage they might offer nonwhites and 
today effectively imposes a minimum also. Almost all gold, diamond and coal 
production -- employing 431, 19 and 80 thousand nonwhites respectively in 1980 
-- is by mines affiliated with the Chamber. Some extraction of other minerals 
(employing 109 thousand nonwhites) is also by affiliated mines and several of 
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the nonaffil i ated mines are owned by the half dozen mining houses which 
dominate the Chamber. Nonwhite labor is recruited for members of the Chamber 
by 1 icensed agencies, much the largest of which is _now called The Employment 
Bureau of Africa (TEBA). Although the diamond sector is affiliated with the 
Chamber, it is not a member for labor purposes and this has had profound 
effects for wages in this sector to be exp 1 ored 1 ater. Moreover, only one 
mine in the other minerals sector employs TEBA to recruit its labor. 
Naturally, the centralization of hiring in recruiting agencies subject to the 
decrees on wages set by consent in the Chamber places _the industry in a 
potentially monopsonistic position if faced with an upward sloping supply of 
1 abor. 
Foreign workers are hired on contracts varying in length from six months 
to two years, according to country of origin. At the end of their contract, 
workers are required to return to their own country and none is permitted to 
bring his family with. him. Not sur.prisingly this system -- designed in part 
to allow men to return for ploughing and consequently not put pressure on 
wages by rendering the family entirely dependent on mine earnings, partly to 
avoid more permanent settlement of foreign blacks albeit without their 
fami 1 i es -- generated very h_i gh turnover rates of labor in the sense of not 
returning after a compulsory home visit. Until the mid-1970's black workers 
could not elect to quit a contract (illegal quitters being termed deserters), 
not until a boycott by American unions of South African coal imports, on the 
grounds they were produced by indentured labor, prompted the abolition of the 
"master and servants" acts. Si nee then, the fixed period contracts have, of 
course, dwindled in importance though nomi n·ally they st il 1 exist. 
In 1973, Ma 1 awi and Mozambique were the two 1 argest supp 1 i ers of foreign 
1 abor, providing 39 and 27 percent of foreign 1 abor respectively. In 1974, 
President Hastings Banda cut off further recruiting of mine workers from 
Malawi -- ostensibly because of the crash of a plane full of recruits. Since 
miners from Malawi were recruited on two year contracts, the effect took two 
years to work through, but the number of Malawians employed in the mines fell 
from 140,000 in 1974 to 2,000 in 1977. At almost the same instant, the 
FREL IMO government finally succeeded in ousting the Portuguese. Whether the 
subsequent sharp dee 1 i ne in Mozambican recruits reflected the demands of the 
South Africans or exigencies of the new regime remains a matter of debate. 
[See First (1977)]. But overall there existed, after 1974, an excess supply 
of foreign workers as mine wages rapidly doubled and tripled. In Botswana and 
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Lesotho, many experienced men are turned away. Very few foreign novices are 
now taken and even current, experienced workers are generally only rehired 
after their compulsory annual home return if issued _with a Valid Reengagement 
Certificate (VRC). VRCs are issued to about 70 percent of workers, subject to 
"good" performance, but obviously the rate of issuance may be varied to 
control numbers. Thus, when Malawi again lifted the ban on recruiting in 
1978, an excess supply of Malawi an recruits emerged for a now limited number 
of openings. 
South African black workers are broadly bifurcated into those with and 
without section 10 rights. 3 Those without must return to their designated 
homeland each year and must leave their family behind while working in a white 
prescribed area. Section 10 workers are on average! better trained, more 
urbanized and better educated in a society where educational policy towards 
blacks has handicapped industry through lack of skilled labor. In 1970, 
average.earnings of nonwhites in manufacturing were exactly three times those 
in gold mining. Combined with atrocious working conditions,_ the social stigma 
attached to mining in South Africa, and the separation from family and 
potential loss of section 
attracted virtually no 
10 rights ensuant upon relocation, this meant mining 
section 10 workers who naturally preferred 
manufacturing. Employers in manufacturing al so preferred section 10 workers 
because of their skills and because they were required to hire labor within 
their own Labour District rather than importing domestic or foreign mi grant 
workers. 
The labor force without section 10 rights faces four alternatives: to 
gamble on being a 11 ocated a manufacturing job through the Labour Bureaux; to 
squat as an agricultural worker at a rate of pay which for regular employees 
even in 1969 was well below the mining wage; to practice subsistence farming 
on the exceedingly poor lands alloted to nonwhites; or to be recruited by TEBA 
for mining. As mine wages rose in the 1970's, the last alternative became 
relatively more attractive although wages in agriculture and manufacturing, 
and employment in the latter also rose· somewhat. For example, the Zulus, whom 
recruiters believed would never work below ground, now do so. Indeed, by 1979 
even South African labor was in excess supply to mining. In large part, this 
is attributable to forced relocation of massive numbers of squatters from 
white farms to homelands in the late l970's, nominally for security reasons, 
expanding the pool· available to mining and rapidly diminishing the marginal 
product in subsistence farming. 
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Unlike nonwhites, white mine workers have been unionized throughout this 
period, and average earnings of whites in gold mining in 1970 were over 20 
times greater than those of nonwhites. Under the apartheid system a rigid 
color bar is· imposed on access to certain occupations, a regime vehemently 
defended by the (white) Mine Workers' Union. Even so there has been some 
realignment of job tasks within occupations, a part of which was formalized in 
an agreement between the mines and the Mine Workers in 1973, but which has 
progressed informally since. 
The 1970's also witnessed unprecedented increases in mineral prices. 
After 1971 the producer price of gold began to rise relative to the South 
African cost of living index. By 1974, the real price was 2.9 times the 1971 
level and by 1980 the increase was 6.7 fold, though the path was not monotonic 
in the interim. Over the same period real diamond prices increased 2.7 times, 
though 1980 prices remained below the 1946-51 average in real terms, 1971 
having been the low point in a steady decline. Coal ·prices are regulated in 
three categories: the price paid by the electricity authority is negotiated 
bilaterally, sales to the remaining domestic market are at administered 
prices, and exports fetch a much higher price but are effectively limited by 
port fact lit ies. The average producer price of coal rose only gradually in 
real terms from 1946 to 1973, then increased 2.4 fold by 1979 as the 
administered price was raised. Prices of other minerals in 1980 were on 
average about equal to those in 1969 in real terms, though a very slight rise 
occurred in between, and remained well below the real prices prevailing in the 
Korean War era. 
Finally, before turning to the model, some of these elements may be pulled 
together to emphasize the sequence of events. Apart from diamonds, the rest 
of the mining sector behaved fairly uniformly from 1946 to 1971. After 1971, 
the Chamber decided to begin raising wages of nonwhites, linking this with 
stabilization of the labor force in the sense of reduced turnover. 4 The 
motivations for raising wages initially were at least three-fold: a concern 
for the publicity in both the domestic and world press being given to the very 
low wages then paid; an efficiency wage argument, enhancing productivity 
through nutrition and hea 1th, the prevai 1 i ng rates often being descrfbed as 
starvation wages; and the hope of reducing turnover and attracting more 
skilled workers. In an inherently dangerous industry and one where security 
from theft (especially in diamonds) is vital, a stabilized labor force is at a 
premium, though possibly at the cost of increasing organization and 
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politicization. The initiative to raise wages apparently stemmed from the 
Anglo American corporation and particularly from new directors appointed about 
1971, but was rendered possible only in an environm~nt of rising gold prices 
after 1971 and of coal subsequently. 5 In the diamond mines, these changes 
began much earlier -- from 1964 onwards -- despite declining real diamond 
prices at the time. In that instance, the personal role played by Harry 
Oppenheimer cannot be discounted nor the role of security risks. From that 
time onwards, wage policy of the diamond sector was independent of that of the 
Chamber, the diamond mines not being affiliated for labor purposes, and wages 
were well above.those in the rest of the industry. 
After 1974 an era of excess supply of foreign labor follows. Though not 
everyone in the industry agrees, this probably resulted from a des ire to 
reduce dependence on foreign 1 abor. 6 Such a desire would have been induced 
by the uncertainties stimulated by the Malawi cut off in 1974, the FRELIMO 
takeover in 1975~ and the mine compound disturbances of 1975 ( reputed'lY 
leaving some 200 dead) prompted by a compulsory deferred pay scheme introduced 
by Lesotho. To attract sufficient South African workers wages continued to 
rise. 
After 1979 the mines were at fu 11 comp 1 ement of labor and South African 
workers in excess supply to the industry as chronic underemp'loyment in the 
homelands was well established under compulsory relocation. From 1978 through 
1980, real wages of nonwhites remained almost constant. The industry is now 
split. Some mining houses wish to raise wages further; others want to lower 
them again, with the realization the latter would mean more employment. The 
South African government has encouraged_ the wage increases in the industry. 
Though concerned with the economic viability of the home 1 and situation they 
have created, their ent.husiasm for expanded employment of blacks in mining is 
not clear, for with the exception of Bophuthatswana the mines are too far from 
the homelands. The government would prefer to see employment created along 
the peripheries of the homelands, for the primary concern is protection of the 
exclusive white environs. 
II. A Stylized Model. 
A. General form. 
The story may be broken into two major periods -- before and after 1974. 
In the earlier era, potential monopsony and job discrimination are major 
features. In more recent times, excess supply of foreign labor and a possible 
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preference for reduced dependence on foreign labor are _added. 
a. Prior to 1974. 
Before 1974 it is assumed no excess supply of nqnwhite labor to the mines 
existed either within South Africa or from abroad. To allow for the 
possibility the combined supply (f. + s, where f is foreign labor supply, s is 
South African supply) is less than infinitely elastic with respect to the wage 
for nonwhites (w), the supply function on which the sector operates is written: 
1. f + s = F(w) 
Job segregation under apartheid, substantially different· access to 
education and training for nonwhites, enforced migrancy resulting in high 
turnover, and low wages generating poor health and nutrition all act to keep 
productivity of nonwhites below that of whites. Recognizing this distinction 
between nonwhite {b) and white (t) labor employed, output (q) is expressed as 
some function: 
2. Q=Q{b,t,k) 
where k is capital stock. 
With the exception of diamonds it is assumed that producers are price 
takers in the commodity market. The flow of gold is small compared to the 
world stock and as a first approximation it is not unreasonable to imagine 
prices determined by international portfolio behavior rather than through flow 
supply and demand. The producer price of coal has also been regulated 
throughout the period under consideration as outlined in section I. 
In acting as a potential monopsonist but not monopolist, it is assumed the 
non-diamond sectors, at least, have been wi 11 ing to hire nonwhite labor up to 
the point where marginal cost equals val_ue of marginal product subject to the 
production function (2). In other words, discrimination against nonwhites is 
confined to job discrimination as reflected in the production function rather 
than to additional wage discrimination.7 In fact, this is probably a very 
plausible assumption, for if anything the concern of the mining houses has 
been to reduce even job di scrimi nation as reflected in their 1973 agreement 
with the white Mine Workers' Uni on noted earlier and in the revisions in job 
tasks. Nonetheless, some results on tests for an extended model incorporating 
wage discrimination are cited in section IV. 
The wages (v) of white workers are determined through bargains struck with 
the Mine Workers' Union and hence are taken as exogenous to this model. The 
first order conditions with respect to both types of labor therefore yield: 
3. p • qb = w' (f + s) • b + w 
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4, p , q R, = V 
where p = price of output, 
qj = marginal product of factor j, 
w'(f + s) = partial derivative of w with respect to f + s. 
The model for this first stage is then closed by assuming: 
5. f + s = b. 
b. After 1974 
In the second stage, three major changes in the model are necessary: a 
preference not to rely on foreign labor is allowed for, as a result foreign 
labor is in excess supply, but this is accompanied by a more stable labor 
force which may be more productive. To characterize this phase, a supply 
function of domestic labor to the mining sector must be distinguished. 
6, S=S(w) 
Moreover, the production function requires modification for reasons to be 
.discussed in (B), but for now we may simply write this as: 
2'. q=Q(b,t,k) 
First order conditions must now be distinguished for domestic and foreign 
labor separately, thus for domestic, foreign and white labor one obtains: 
3'.i. p Qs = w'(s) • b + w 
ii. p Qf = w + w 
4'. p QR,=V 
where Qj = marginal product of factor j, 
w' (s) = partial derivative of w with respect to s, 
t = a coefficient of preference not to rely on foreign labor. 8 
It is i ntri gui ng to note that this _preference against foreign 1 abor has 
not taken the form of wage discrimination. Foreign and domestic labor continue 
to be paid equal wages. A potential reason might be tension in the compounds 
between miners 1 i vi ng and working together but rewarded differentially. Yet 
this friction might be avoided by means of a foreign remittance or recruitment 
tax. For such taxes there are precedents, though revenue, collected by the 
mines or recruiting agencies, has gone to the sending countries. I believe the 
true reason for maintaining equal wages has stemmed from the initial cause of 
pay increases - sensitivity to accusations of paying exploitative wages. 
8. Specific form. 
To estimate this system, specific forms of the production functions and 
nonwhite labor supply functions must be imposed.· The overall labor supply 
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function, (1), is assumed to have constant wage elasticity n and is specified 
as: 
7. ln b =Yo+ n • ln w + r • X + Y1 • ln b_l . 
where b_1 is b lagged by one year, a term included to reflect the effects of 
the two year contracts prevalent in some of the major supplying countries, 
remembering that such contracts were binding prior to repeal of the masters 
and servants acts. X is a vector of principal components of exogenous 
elements, both abroad and within South Africa, likely to have shifted the 
supply function 9• 
As noted in section I, jobs in the South African manufacturing sector have 
paid nonwhites much better wages than mining. But availability of the former 
has been limited, particularly for those without section 10 rights who are the 
really potential mine workers. The supply of South African nonwhite labor to 
the mining sector is therefore made a function of the expected wage in 
. manufacturing (m). In addition, supply is likely to rise with the size of the 
nonwhite male labor force (n). Given this, a constant wage elasticity (a) 
specification of (6) is again adopted: 
8. ln s = a0 + a • ln w + "l • m + a 2 • n + a3 • l n s_1 
Capital inputs are in fact divided into two types -- fixed _capital (k) and 
equipment (e). In selecting a form of the production function for derived 
demand analysis it is important to allow for substitution between factors. 
Four factors of production (b, t, k, and e) and their interactions necessarily· 
imply a lengthy formulation, and within these general requirements two 
specifications are explored -- a translog and a quadratic. (For a discussion 
of the properties of each see Fuss. McFadden and Mundlak (1978).) The 
quadratic form is: 
9. q = a + 8 • b + >. • t + K k + e • e 
+ 8>. • b • t + s K. b k + Se • b e 
+ >.K • t k + >.e • t e + Ke • k e 
+ 1/2( 88 • b2 + >.>. • t 2 + KK • k2 + ee • e2) 
+ 8T • s • T + T • T 
The last two terms require some additional explanation. Tis a dummy variable 
turned on after 1974. Thus ST reflects any change in productivity of nonwhite 
labor in the later period, as the labor force is localized with the intent of 
establishing a more stable, experienced work force. But this period also 
experienced very sharp rises in mineral prices, and some mines began to rework 
previously abandoned deposits and- several open cast coal mines commenced 
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oper.ition, each with inherently different productivity -- hence the term ,T. 
The translog verson of (10) is of course identical except q, b, R., k, e and s 
are each replaced by their natural logarithms. 
Solving the first order conditions subject to these specific forms 
provides for the quadratic case: 
10. b = -8 + { 1 +n) • w { 1-T) + 1 • w • T + 'P • T - B>. • 
BB n • 88 p BB p BB 
R. - BK. k - Be. e 
BB BB 
~ = ->. + 1. v - a>.. b - >.K • k - >.e. e 
>.>. I">. p IT IT IT 
{J expresses the preference not to rely on foreign labor in units of labor 
and is assumed constant, so that in the quadratic case J = p.sa.¢. A negative 
value of¢ indicates a preference against foreign labor, a zero value implies 
no such preference. Comparing (3'.i) and {3'.ii) it is readily seen 
that J = w'. b+p. (Qf-Qs), so that if no monopsony power were exercised 
vis-a-vis South African labor in this period and if foreign and domestic 
workers were perfect substitutes,¢ would be zero. 
In the context of the translog production functions, all terms in b, R., k, 
and e are replaced by their natural logarithms, and wand v are multiplied by 
their respective own factor ·amount over output. 
The system of equations (10) assumes instantaneous adjustment. A simple, 
flexible accelerator may however be appended by adding a lagged dependent 
variable term to each equation. The well-known interpretation is that all 
terms in (10) are thereby multiplied by one minus the flexible accelerator 
coefficient. 10 
Finally, as mentioned earlier, the model is to be estimated for each of 
the gold, diamond, coal and other minerals subsectors separately. For gold -
and coal, (10) is appropriate, but for the other two some modification is 
necessary. The extraction of other minerals is almost entirely by mines which 
do not recruit through TEBA and commonly not members of the Chamber. It is 
unlikely these mines have restrained their hiring to help the monopsony 
position of the industry as a whole, so they are assumed to have behaved as 
though n were infinite 11• 
Section I notes that the diamond sector is. not a member of the Chamber for 
labor purposes and has pursued an independent wage policy with stabilization 
of the nonwhite labor force commencing ten years earlier. To explore the 
longer term productivity consequences of this stabilization and its 
implication for the role of white labor, the last two terms of the production 
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function, (2) are replaced by T.(ST.b.t.+).T .£ .t+S).T.b.R-) where T is now a 
dummy for the post 1964 period and t measures time. Thus, ).T and ST reflect 
progress in productivity of white and nonwhite labo~ with the passage of time 
and gaining of experience under stabilization, SAT reflects any shift in labor 
substitutability after diminution in job barriers. In addition, the 
possibility of exploitation of monopoly power by DeBeers warrants 
incorporation. Thus, if a represents the elasticity of demand for diamonds, 
rearrangement of the first order conditions for nonwhite and white labor in 
diamonds provides, in the quadratic case: 
11. b = -s + 1 w - 8). • £ - SK 
as (1+1/a) .ss I) as ss k - Se • e + T. ss 
£ = -). + 1 
n (1+1/a).u 
V - S). • b - ).K • k - ).e • e + T. r-~: . 
p U u U AA 
Estimates of equations (9), (10) and (11) are discussed in section IV, but 
first a few brief notes on the data are in order. 
I II. The Data 
The model is estimated on annual data from 1946 to 1980. Space does not 
permit a full discussion of the sources and compilation. of data assembled for 
this study, however a few words are in order. 
Output by each of the subsectors is measured in physical terms (ounces of 
go 1 d, 1000 carats of di amends and tons of coa 1). For the other mi nera 1 s, a 
quantity index is adopted -- actually several published Divisia indices 
spliced together -- with base in 1957 at 10D0. Employment is simply the 
average numbers at work during the year.- The two types of capital stock -- k 
and e -- are measured in constant; 1970 10D0 Rands. The stock figures are 
derived from gross expenditures deflated by the South African cost of 1 iving 
index, with k depreciated 1 i nearly at 4 per cent, e at 10 percent. k 
incorporates mining property, shafts and mine development, and e is simply 
equipment. Wages are measured by earnings per employee per year. Output 
prices are derived from realized value of sales divided by sales -- Rands per 
ounce of gold, per carat of diamonds, per ton of coal and 1000 Rands per index 
unit of output for other minerals. The South African, nonwhite, male labor 
force is proxied by the nonwhite, male population ages 18 to 49, measured in 
millions of men. The expected wage in manufacturing is then nonwhite 
employment in manufacturing, construction and South African Railways and 
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Table 1. Nonwhite Labor Input Equations 
Quadratic Trans log 
Gold Coal Diamonds Other Gold Coal Diamonds 
Intercept 154538 53835 -5113 11319 6.83 9.88 .563 
(2.00) (9.28) (1.67) (0.74) ( 2.46) (10.40) ( 0. 32) 
Wage term -118 -14850 -.0017 
( 5. 94) ( 2. 70) ( 2. 3 7) 
Wage term -8774 -139 -2. 73 -1.82 
pre '74 ( 2. 43) { 2. 63) (1.74) ( 1.85) 
Wage term -2647 -1.60 -.424 -1.34 
post '74 {1.50) ( o. 03) (1.11) (1.2g) 
Post '74 -74207 -18136 12519 -.217 -0.43 
dummy ( 2. 41) (1.75) (1.68) (1.71) ( 0. 23) 
White 1 abor 2.27 5.32 3.55 11.5 .280 .430 .559 
( 1. 53) (11.35) ( 3. 60) (9. 03) {1.50). ( 5. 22) {2.24) 
Equipment -.029 -.051 .101 0.65 -.008 -.136 .266 
( 0. 37) {2.94) ( 3. 97) (0.67 (0.07) (2. 46) {2.75) 
Fixed .220 -.089 -.113 -.139 .246 -.068 -.062 
capital ( 4. 56) ( 2. 59) { 3. 56) {1.09) ( 1. 56) (0.87) (0.40) 
Time 669 .110 
post '64 {4.19) (0.21) 
White labor -2.99 -.024 
post '64 ( 3. 29) (0.13) 
Lagged dependent .470 .247 
variable { 6. 08) ( 1. 22) 
Rho .385 .424 -.001 .816 .419 .457 .614 
Standard error .155 .168 .192 6.46 .148 .162 .189 
of rho 
Number of 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 
observations 
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Harbours relative to male labor force, multiplied by annual average earnings 
of blacks in manufacturing deflated by the cost of food index. 
IV. Estimation of the Model 
All equations are estimated by three stage least squares using Fair's 
technique with respect to instrumental variables, unless otherwise noted. The 
theory suggests that a large number of non 1 in ear, cross-equation constraints 
might be imposed on the estimates. However, no such restrictions are imposed 
here except in the context of hypothesis testing. 
a. Monopsony 
From the equation for nonwhite labor in ( 10) it is readily seen that the 
coefficients on wage before and after 1974 differ only by inclusion of (l+ry)/n 
in the former, where n is the elasticity of labor supply. If the sector tends 
towards behavior consistent with an infinitely elastic supply, rather than as 
a monopsonist, (l+n)/n should approach· one and the coefficients on the two 
period wage terms become equal. As discussed in section II, this hypothesis 
is to be tested with respect to the gold and coal sectors, neither the diamond 
nor other minerals sector having been part of the Chamber for labor purposes. 
The estimates of nonwhite labor input equations are presented in Table 1, with 
t-statistics for a zero null-hypothesis presented in parentheses beneath each 
coefficient. 
In each context -- gold and coal, quadratic and translog -- the wage terms 
have negative estimated coefficients with a larger absolute value in the 
earlier period. Moreover, in each case except that of coal in translog form, 
this difference between time periods is.statistically significant at more than 
a 90 percent confidence level. 
But to argue that these results reflect exploitation of monopsony power, 
at least in gold, one must proceed further. Was the supply of labor facing 
the industry indeed upward sloping in the earlier period before 1974? Table 2 
presents an estimate of the overall labor supply equation (7) up to 1974.12 
Al though the region as a who 1 e is frequently referred to by the industry as a 
labor reserve, the estimate of (7) shows an upward sloping supply of labor 
with elasticity even significantly less than one at· a 99 percent confidence 
level. Merle Lipton (1980, p. 109) notes: 
"It had long been argued by the industry that Black peasants 
have a backward-sloping supply curve ••• they were target 
workers • • • The fact that this argument was a convenient 
rationalization for low wages was nowhere more clearly 
demonstrated than by the action of the Chamber, in the wake 
of the gold price rise, in raising wages to increase supply." 
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The result in Table 2 is certainly consistent with Merle Lipton's view. 
Furthermore, the estimate of 11 reported in Table 2 is not significantly 
different from that implied by the estimated nonwhite labor input equations 
for gold, when :n is obtained as a nonlinear transformation of the wage 
coefficients in the two periods, (Berndt et al, (1974)) 
But this latter derivation of n and· indeed the prior tests for monopsony 
are founded on the theory that the coefficients in Table 1 on the wage_ term 
after 1974 equal ss. This may be tested directly by viewing the production 
functions, and estimates for the case of gold are shown in Table 3. 13 
Therein, both the translog and quadratic estimates provide a negative 
coefficient on the square of nonwhite labor. Following the Gallant and 
Jorgenson (1979) test for nonlinear, cross-equation restrictions, this 
production function estimate of as is not significantly d.ifferent from the 
implied value estimated in the nonwhite labor input equation. 
All of the evidence is thus consistent with exploitation of monopsony 
power, at least by the dominant gold sector, before 1974. Indeed, this seems 
eminently sensible, providing a rationale for the centralized system of 
recruiting and imposition of the maximum permissible average wage payable by 
member mines, as outlined in Section I. In addition, the recruiting system 
appears to have provided the mining industry with_ an ability to respond 
quickly to changing situations. Thus, if lagged dependent variables are 
inserted in the nonwhite labor equations for gold and coal, the flexible 
accelerators prove statistically indistinguishable from zero and these terms 
are consequently omitted from the equations reported in Table 1. In contrast, 
the combination of up to two year contracts plus the master and servants laws, 
prohibiting legal quitting, have rendered the ability of workers to adapt to 
changing conditions very sluggish. The coefficient on the lagged dependent 
variable in the overall labor supply equation in Table 2 is, thus, not only 
significantly positive but indeed very large. 
b. Preference for' domestic labor 
In (10) a negative coefficient q, on the post 1974 dummy represents a 
preference not to rely on foreign workers. In Table 1, this coefficient is 
estimated to be significantly less than zero at a 95 percent confidence level 
Table 2. Nonwhite Labor Supply Equations 
Intercept 
Log wage 
[11 principal component 
terms for. shifts in 
supply]. 
Expected wage in industry 
Labor force 
Lagged dependent variable 
Durbin's h statistic 
Number of observations 
Foreign and 
Domestic Labor 
1948 - 1973 
-3.22 









1947 - 1978 
1.97 
( 1. 70) 
.498 











Table 3. Production Functions 
Gold Diamonds 
Quadratic Translog Quadratic Translog 
Intercept -.14-.-109 -1055 -121962 -677 
(1.16) {l.62) (1.77) {0.58) 
Nonwhite labor -755 -257 4.21 261 
( 1.39) ( 1.89) {2.55) ( 2.61) 
White labor 9417 340 48.6 -4.35 
( 1.61) ( 2. 07) (1.24) (0.01) 
Capital 331 229 -.111 41.l 
( 1.41) {2.10) (0.35) (1.94) 
Equiprnent -158 -101 .313 -146 
(0.48) ( 1.61) (0.38) ( 2.31) 
Nonwhite*white .032 34.7 -.001 11.3 
(2.78) ( 3. 32) (0.90) (0.86) 
Nonwh ite*capi ta l .00084 20.8 -. 25*lo-4 -1.21 
( 2. 08) ( 2.84) ( 1. 86) (0.63) 
Nonwhite*equipment -.0012 -15.5 -. 54-.-l0-4 -3.38 
(1.91) ( 2.59) ( 2. 22) (0.62) 
White*capital -.010 -31.2 .1&10-3 2.18 
( 1. 64) (2.45) ( 1. 53·) (0.59) 
White*equipment .010 19.1 -.13*10-4 .474 
( 1.17) ( 2. 20) (0.07) (O. 06) 
Capital*equipment .00048 14.6 -. 20*10-5 -4.22 
Nonwhi te2 
{1.49) ( 2.56) (0.43) ( 3. 02) 
-.0011 -7.63 -. 29*lo-4 -16.2 
White2 
(1.48) {1.38) (0.46) ( 3. 50) 
-.204 -28.4 -.005 -7 .65 
Capital2 
{2.51) {2.98) (0.96) (0.35) 
-.00023 -12.8 -.15*10-5 -.145 
Equipment2 
( 1. 94) {2.86) ( 1.41) (0.39) 
-.00023 -3.98 .11*10-5 10.4 
(0.88) ( 2. 22) (1.40) ( 4. 06) 
Dom. lab. post '74 -24.1 -.242 
( 1. 82) (2.05) 
Post '74 dummy -.17*107 2.74 
(0.55) ( 1. 88) 
Nonwhite*time post '64 .D92 2.64 
(8.20) {5.10) 
White*time post '64 -.265 -2.96 
{5.01) { 4. 74) 
Nonwhite*white post '64 - • l 4;.. lQ-3 -.042 
{2.56) ( 0 .82) 
Durbin-Watson statistic 2.13 2.16 
Rho -.311 -.669 
Standard error of rho .231 .273 
Number of observations 33 33 33 33 
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in both formulations for gold, and for coal in the quadratic case. Indeed, 
the effect is quite large. Thus, the quadratic estimates suggest that despite 
the escalated wages of this period, the gold sec~or would have wanted to 
employ some 70,000 more nonwhites and coal nearly 20,000 extra, as mineral 
prices rose, had a policy of switching to domestic labor not been pursued. In 
contrast, the other minerals sector, being outside of the centralized policies 
of the Chamber, if anything significantly raised their nonwhite labor use in 
this same period, the coefficent on the post 1974 dummy being positive for 
th at sector 14• 
As noted in connection with (10), if additional domestic labor could be 
hired without raising the wage or lowering productivity, it could not be 
argued that a policy of reliance on domestic labor is costly to the industry. 
However, the production function estimates for gold in Table 3 indeed show a 
significant decline in productivity after 1974 as the labor force becomes 
increasingly South African. Far fronr increasing productivity, as intended 
with a policy of diminished turnover, the replacement of skilled foreign 
workers by inexperienced South African novices proved costly. It was a 1 so 
costly in terms of wages, for the estimated supply equation for South African 
labor, in Table 2, again displays a significant upward slope with respect to 
mine wage. That estimate also brings out the role of the aspiration for a far 
better paying wage in industry in promoting reluctance to commit to the 
indignities of mine work, at least until 1978. Thereafter, compulsory 
relocation in the homelands has resulted in an excess supply even of South 
African workers for the mines. 
c. White and nonwhite labor 
Thus, the movement toward localization of the nonwhite labor force 
adversely affected productivity in gold, though some mining houses clearly 
hoped stabilization would enhance skill levels. On the other hand, in the 
diamond sector, erosion of the job color bar after 1964 and reduced turnover 
of the nonwhite labor force proved more successful. From the production 
functions for diamonds in Table 3, it is seen that the productivity of 
nonwhite labor is estimated to have a significant upward trend after 1964. 
This is also supported by the upward trend in the demand for nonwhite labor, 
at least in the quadratic case in Table 115• 
But concurrent with the rising productivity and demand for nonwhites in 





after 1964 is significantly negative in 




white labor input equation in Table 4. It seems th~ erosion of the job color 
bar indeed had precisely the effects on white labor the Mine Workers' Union 
has always feared. Thus, in the production functions, the coefficient on the 
nonwhite*white labor interaction after 1964 proves· negative though 
significantly so only in the quadratic case. With this the nonwhite labor 
input equations are quite consistent, but not those for whites. It seems at 
least overt displacement of white labor by nonwhi_te hiring may have been 
successfully resisted despite productivity implications. 
Indeed, from both Tables 1 and 4, the hiring of white and nonwhite labor 
is estimated to have been complementary across all sectors 16• With tight 
maintenance of job delineation between races, add it ion al nonwhite labor has 
required extra whites in supervisory and skilled posts rather than displacing 
them. It is also interesting to note that white lab-or has been a quasi-fiX-ed 
factor for all sectors, in the sense that the flexible accelerator terms are 
positive, reflecting a significant difficulty in rapidly adjusting the white 
labor contingent. In contrast, as noted earlier, the centralized recruiting 
and prevention of worker organization have permitted far greater flexibility 
for the mines in adapting the nonwhite labor force numbers. To this, there is 
an exception in diamonds, where the lagged dependent variable term for 
nonwhites proves positive though lower than for whites. It seems that one 
cost to stabilization in diamonds has been a reduced ability or willingness 
rapidly to transform employment of nonwhites. 
d. Monopoly in diamonds and wage discrimination 
No support is found in the data for either a hypothesis of concern for 
monopoly in labor application to diamonds or of wage discrimination against 
nonwhites elsewhere. 
The estimated coefficients on the wage terms in the labor input equations 
for diamonds embody three components: the expression involving the_ elasticity 
of demand for diamonds, o ; the productivity elements, SS or u ; and the 
flexible accelerator terms. The critical expression d=l/(1+1/o) may, however, 
be isolated by imposing nonlinear cross-equation and within-equation 
restrictions on the other two components. Note that d approaches one from 
above as o tends toward minus infinity. A null-hypothesis of behavior as if 
product demand were perfectly elastic may therefore be tested by means of a 
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Table 4. White Labor Input Equations 
Quadratic Translog 
Gold Coal Diamonds Other Gold Coal Di amends Other 
Intercept 10121 419 959 1966 4.31 -4.82 -.469 .068 
(1.74) (0.38) (2.27) ( 1.02) (2.84) (3.36) (0.41) (O. 06) 
Wage term -22.3 -1.14 -.008 -77. 7 . -.410 -.870 -.0001 -.0004 
( 4. 24) (5.11) (0.02) ( 1.45) (2.37) (2.97) (0.32) (0.51) 
Nonwhite .011 .086 .006 .063 .105 .818 .169 .534 
labor (O .83) ( 5.89) (0.43) ( 9.32) (0.85) (5.52) (2.93) ( 6. 79) 
Equipment .004 -.005 -.010 -.007 .165 -.019 -.023 .074 
(0 .52) (2.15) (1.91) (0.73) (2.38) (0.45) (0.40) (0.77) 
Fixed -.006 .005 .025 .023 -.308 -.082 .403 .152 
capital ( 1.18) ( 0. 99) (6.92) (2.51) (3.75) (0.98) (6.97) (1.92) 
Time -111 -1.28 
post '64 ( 8.17) ( 7. 07) 
Nonwhite .135 .387 
1 abor (8.22) (7. 00) 
post '64 
Lagged .799 .511 .694 .228 .671 .671 .418 .046 
dependent (5.86) (5.13) (6.44) ( 1.86) ( 5. 55) (4.60) ( 3. 51) (0.33) 
variable 
Rho .316 .039 -.521 .866 .420 .140 -.319 .686 
Standard .188 .186 .165 .148 .201 .130 .180 .150 
error of rho 
Number of 33 25 33 33 33 25 33 33 
observations 
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Ga 11 ant-Jorgenson chi-squared test on the change in sum of squared residuals 
when d=l is imposed. In no case -- white or nonwhite, quadratic or translog --
does the estimate of d prove significantly greater _than one. At least from 
this simple specification there is thus no evidence to suggest labor hiring 
has been restricted in diamonds for fear of depressing the world price of 
diamonds. Certainly DeBeers does limit diamond sales at times when there is 
downward pressure on prices, but it is interesting to note that the 
correlation coefficient for the first differences in physical sales and 
production of diamonds in South Africa is only .61 over the sample period. It 
seems at least temporary restricted sales for price support result in 
increased stock-piling rather than reduced production. To some extent this 
may be precisely because of the difficulties of quickly adjusting the labor 
force as emphasized by our estimates. In addition, DeBeers has the option of 
reducing their scale of production outside of South Africa and may have been 
more re·luctant to make such adjustments-within their South African operations~ 
Lastly, consider the possibility of wage discrimination against nonwhites 
in addition to the job barriers embodied in the production functions. One way 
to model such potential discrimination is to envision the mines hiring as if 
this imposed some implicit psychic cost, c, for each additional nonwhite 
hired. Thus, c would be added to the right-hand side of equations (3) and 
( 3'. i). To the estimated nonwhite equation in ( 10) this would add a term 
c/(p. SS), (multiplied by b/q in the translog case). If the nonwhite labor 
equations for gold, coal and others are re-estimated including such a term, 
the resulting value of c/SS is significantly negative only in the quadratic 
case for coal and even there fails a 5 percent o~e tail test. There is thus 
no systematic- evidence of wage discrimination against nonwhites from this 
simple test, though obviously job discrimination is quite overt under the 
apartheid structure. 
V. Some Closing Remarks 
Despite the popular notion that much of southern Africa formed a vast 
labor reserve for the South African mines -- a traditional surplus labor 
economy -- the supply curve on which the industry operated has been shown not 
only to be upward sloping with respect to mine wages of nonwhites but indeed 
inelastic. In the period 1946-74, the Chamber of Mines took significant 
advantage of this -- principally through the dominant gold mining sector -- to 
exploit its monopsony power. By the mid 1970's- rising mineral prices 
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permitted ·sharp wage increases motivated by a desire to stabilize the labor 
force (in the sense of reducing turnover) and by vehement public criticism of 
the "starvation wages" previously paid. The rising 1:1ages attracted more South 
African workers and on their supply curve the industry has continued to act as 
a monopsonist. In this later period, foreign labor has been in excess supply 
and a significant P.reference not to rely on foreign labor has been 
demonstrated. Such a preference is not irrational from the mining industry's 
perspective given the political uncertainties of the region as, for example, 
FRELIMO displaced the cooperative Portuguese in Mozambique .and Malawi's labor 
was temporarily withdrawn entirely. But stabilization of the South African 
labor force has not, thus far, resulted in significant productivity gains, 
rather the foregoing results suggest diminished productivity as South African 
novices increasingly displaced experienced foreign miners. Moreover, black 
mine workers have now succeeded in achieving a greater degree of organization, 
previously thwarted by the mines precisely by maintaining diversified options 
on foreign labor. 
The job color bar, despite limited liberalization of job tasks, has been 
protected by the apartheid laws partly under instigation from the Mine 
Workers' Union. Thus, maintenance of this bar has meant that black and white 
labor have acted as complementary factors, and barring nonwhites from skilled 
positions helped to support the twenty fold white - nonwhite earnings ratio as 
of 1970. To what extent the mining houses acquiesced in this legislated job 
discrimination remains unclear. Certainly the apartheid structure has imposed 
costs on the mining industry, some negotiated erosion of job barriers has 
occurred, and no evidence of wage discrimination by the mines is discerned, 
superimposed on the obvious job discrimination. 
To much of this the diamond sector is 
independent wage policy since the mid 1960s the 
an exception. Pursuing an 
diamond sector has stabilized 
its nonwhite labor force, eroded the skill barriers and largely dispensed with 
the mine compound living quarters. Both the particular need for security and 
the personal involvement of Harry Oppenheimer are commonly cited as 
instigating factors in this transition. The result has been a significant 
rise in nonwhite labor productivity and a simultaneous decline in productivity 
of whites, though overt displacement of white miners seems to have been 
successfully resisted. An additional consequence for the diamond sector is an 
estimated flexible accelerator on nonwhite labor input more in line with that 
on white labor throughout the industry, reflecting the slower response in 
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adjusting any stabilized labor force. Elsewhere the industry has shown 
greater swiftness in adjusting, via the recruitment network, its nonwhite 
labor force as demand conditions shifted -- far more swiftness than permitted 
to labor supply bound by irreversible contracts under the master and servants 
acts. 
Since 1979 even South African labor has been in excess supply following an 
outward shift in the supply curve induced by compulsory population relocation 
in the homelands. Today, the Chamber is in consequence split between those 
mining houses who wish to raise nonwhite wages further and those who argue for 
real wage reduction, both realizing lower wages would stimulate more 
employment. To go their separate ways would, according to interviews with 
industrialists, effectively break the Chamber and the Chamber is vital not 
only for labor purposes but for such activities as lobbying for tax 
posit ions. That the diamond sector cou 1 d pursue its own wage po 1 icy while 
remaining a Chamber member for· other ·purposes is attributable to the 
negligible size of its labor force. Government has generally encouraged the 
recent wage increases, but while concerned with the risks inherent in mass 
unemployment in the home 1 ands, they would prefer to see emp 1 oyment created 
around the peripheries of the homelands than in mines located too close to the 
exclusive white environs. 
The future of this labor market -- historically of major importance to 
several of the labor supplying countries for employment, foreign exchange and 
income -- is very uncertain. Even if the South African internal political 
structure remains intact for some years, much wi 11 depend on future mineral 
prices and the value of diamonds and gold have recently, substantially 
declined. From 1979 onwards, TEBA has maintained a target of 60 percent local 
40 percent foreign 1 abor. Some observers predict the foreign component wi 11 
decline. If so, Lesotho is likely not to experience substantial cuts, for as 
with the homelands there is fear of creating pockets of mass unemployment and 
poverty within the frontiers of South Africa. The proportions in which the 
other labor sending countries would be cut would probably depend on their 
political conduct vis-a-vis South Africa. Indeed, it will be interesting to 
see if there may even be revival in Mozambique recruitment, now that a new, 
inter-governmental understanding has been signed with South Africa. 
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Footnotes 
*Associate Professor of Economics, Boston University, Boston, MA 02215. Too 
many people have contributed to this work through interviews and discussions 
to mention and thank each individually. To all I am most grateful. The 
initial phase of this study was supported by the International Labour 
Organization, but opinions and interpretations herein expressed are those of 
the author alone. 
l., Nonwhite" comprises those designated b 1 ack, co·l ored and Asian. The term 
"domestic" or South African includes the several Black States or homelands, 
such as Transkei and Bophuthatswana. 
2see Wilson (1972), Breytenbach (1979) and Lipton (1980). 
3"Secti on 10" refers to section 10 of the Bantu Urban Areas Act of 1945, 
which prohibited blacks from remainjng in the "white" areas for more than 72 
hours unless they had resided there -continuously since birth, had worked 
continuously for the same employer for 10 years, or for more tHan one employer 
for 15 years. See Lipton (1980), who reports that 42 percent of black workers 
have section 10 rights. 
4
Lipton (1980) uses the term stabilize in this context to mean to settle 
permanently with one's family. The industry's interest in this form of 
stabilization is far more ambivalent. 
5The operations in which Anglo American was involved in the Zambian copper 
belt had their labor force localised and stabilised some 10 years before the 
turning point in South Africa. See Daniel (1979). 
6rn the first eleven months of 1981, 15.88 percent of all TEBA recruits were 
novices, but for no foreign country did this rate exceed 10 percent and for 
Mozambique and Malawi it was less than 1 percent. Given the obvious, excess 
supply of foreign novices, this strongly supports the notion of bias against 
foreign dependence. Indeed, the stated industry policy is to take no 




complications arising from exhaustible resources are 
simplicity, which is relatively justifiable in view of the 
massive reserves of most minerals. 
8since foreign labor is in excess supply and hence infinitely elastic at the 
going wage, an objective function for the sector consistent with (3'.ii), 
omitting white labor and capital for brevity, would be: 
n = p • Q( f, s) - w( s) • ( f + s) - 'I' • f. 
In other words, the mining houses act as if the cost of hiring foreign labor 
exceeds the wage rate by an amount 'I' per foreigner. 
9The 23 underlying variables are: population and rainfall in Botswana, 
Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique (rainfall excluded), South Africa and Swaziland; 
the expected domestic wage in Botswana and Lesotho, the price of maize, cotton 
·and tobacco in Malawi; ·J)"lantation employment, industrial employment and wage, 
and marketed crops in Mozambique; employment and wage for blacks in South 
African manufacturing; and a dummy for independence of Ma 1 awi. The demand 
model presented in this paper is part of a larger study incorporating also the 
supply side of the story, in which these 23 variables receive explicit 
treatment. See Lucas (1983). 
10see Nadiri and Rosen (1973). Extension to a nondiagonal matrix of 
coefficients therein proposed or to decision making when lags are constraints, 
as in Yoshikawa (1980), is left for later work. 
• 
11In the post 1974 period, the other minerals sector has continued to follow 
the wage leaders partly for the same reasons which motivated the initial 
raises by the Chamber (particularly in those mines within the other minerals 
sector owned by the large mining houses), partly because many of these mines 
lacked the organization to recruit foreign labor and local labor required 
higher wages. 
12This estimate is obtained by two-stage least squares, using Fair's 
technique. The equation includes 11 principal component terms in the vector 
X, selected by backward stepwise regression, not explicitly shown in Table 2. 
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13No correction for first-order serial correlation is made in these 
estimates. If rho, a serial correlation coefficient, is estimated, the 
associated t-statistic for a zero null-hypothesis is 0.57 for the quadratic 
case and 1.07 for the translog. 
14No estimate of the translog nonwhite labor input equation is reported for 
the other minerals sector owing to a high level of collinearity encountered. 
15rhe sale price of diamonds is quite volatile. The estimated labor input 
equations therefore deflate wage by price lagged one period. 
16rhe white 1 abor equations for the coal sector omit the years prior to 
1956. During 1955, the Mine Workers' Union demanded and received a sharp pay 
increase in coal. The bargaining position of the Union was strengthened by a 
perceived white labor shortage in coal prior to this and the industry 
responded by intensified training and recruiting of whites, with significant 
increased immigration of European trainees. By 1956, the Chamber Annual 
Report (1957) notes an easing in the shortage of European personnel. 
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